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Case No. 930279-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), and Utah R. Crim. 
P. 26(2)(a), whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action 
may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and 
conviction for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony, 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or 
in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the officer's use of a single photograph for 
identification purposes was unduly suggestive when the process 
omitted another suspect who looked like the defendant and who was 
positioned to have stolen the involved check? "[T]he trial court/ 
when confronted with an issue of the admissibility of an eyewitness 
identification, must preliminarily determine whether the 
identification is sufficiently reliable that its admission and 
consideration by the jury will not deny the defendant due process." 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 779 (Utah 1991); State v. Mitchell, 
824 P.2d 469, 471 (Utah App. 1991) ("Since questions of 
constitutional rights are questions of law, we give no deference to 
the trial court's conclusion . . . " ) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-501, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Anne M. Stirba, 
presiding. On March 9, 1993, a jury convicted Mr. Matthew Wright of 
the above charge. (R 116). 
The trial court then sentenced him to an indeterminate term 
of zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison, together with a $750 
fine and surcharge. The court immediately stayed its sentence, 
placing Mr. Wright on probation with accompanying conditions. 
(R 119). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 15, 1992, a black male entered Smith's Food 
King on 2100 South and 900 East where he asked a checker, Brett 
Huff, to cash a check. (R 228-29). The payor of the $50 check was 
Robert Schmidt, a person with whom Huff was familiar. Schmidt and 
Huff had previously worked together at another branch of Smith's. 
(R 225-26, 230). Mr. Schmidt is Caucasian. 
The parties do not dispute that the individual attempting 
to cash the check was not Mr. Schmidt. Rather, at issue is whether 
Mr. Huff misidentified Matthew Wright or whether another black male 
who resembled Mr. Wright had attempted to cash the check. 
Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Wright had been roommates and have 
since remained friends even after the trial. (R 213). At trial, 
Mr. Schmidt indicated that he did not know whether Matthew Wright 
had attempted to cash the check, and, in fact, had suspected another 
person. (R 213, 220). Schmidt acknowledged that other black males 
had lived near or visited their residence, including at least one 
individual who resembled Mr. Wright. (R 215-20). 
William Clark was one such individual. Mr. Clark and 
Mr. Wright had the same hair style; the same hair length; they 
weighed the same; and they were approximately the same height, with 
nothing more than an inch or two between them. (R 218-19). As 
summarized by Mr. Schmidt, "They looked a lot alike. But just 
because I know them I could tell the difference myself." (R 219). 
Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Wright had been roommates for 
approximately five or six months. (R 207). By contrast, Mr. Huff 
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and Mr. Wright had only worked "side by side" for one fifteen to 
twenty minute period "putting the Shasta on the shelf." (R 227, 
242). Huff stressed that their shift together lasted eight hours 
and that he also had seen Wright "coming and going as I [Huff] was 
leaving work and he [Wright] was coming to work." (R 227). 
Brett Huff admitted that he had joked about (and with) 
African-Americans, making generalizations and "lumping 
African-Americans together into a 'they' kind of category who 
differed significantly from Caucasians." (R 253). Huff was from a 
community with very few black individuals, with limited exposure 
other than a six-month stint in the military. (R 236-37). 
When the black male asked Huff to cash the check, Huff 
believed that the person was Matthew Wright. (R 239) . However, 
Huff still felt the need to ask the individual for identification. 
Huff claimed he did this because, "I didn't know if Matt would 
remember me or not." (R 239). 
For the first time at trial Huff stated that the man 
mumbled, "You remember me; we worked together at Kearns." (R 235). 
Besides contradicting his explanation about asking for 
identification, the claimed hearsay remark was omitted entirely from 
all of the reports by the investigating officers. The parties 
disputed whether the remark was actually made. 
There was no confrontation during the incident. Huff did 
not refer to anyone by name; he simply indicated that he would have 
to clear the check with the manager. Huff departed for a telephone, 
seeking clarification from Mr. Schmidt. Schmidt told Huff to tear 
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Officer Olson, who interviewed Huff after the incident, 
acknowledged that he had used only one picture of Mr. Wright for 
identification purpos^R Olsnii Il nil m i l nil 'iiy I limit p h I rii t a y s o l 
six to eight similar looking suspects were more often used. Olson 
noted that after the one photo confirmation process, he simply took 
Huff at his estigate other potential 
suspects. (R 270-72), 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Brett Huff, the Smith's employee in the case at bar, 
mistake- had attempted to cash the 
check. While Matthew Wright may have resembled the suspect, 
Mr. Huff's identification of h :i m was flawed because anothf 
nidi vidua I V i U lain (." J a i. Ik, i i looked like Mr Wright, Clark 
also had been in position to have stolen and cashed the check. 
However, the police officer's one picture identificati oi I process 
precluded Mi Hull In mi even considering another suspect, a fatal 
omission given the similarities between Wright and Clark and because 
of the likelihood that the sole pictur 




THE IDENTIFICATION PROCESS WAS UNNECESSARILY SUGGESTIVE 
AND IMPROPER 
The parties do not dispute that Officer Olson used only one 
photograph for identification purposes. "The danger of such an 
identification procedure, of course, is the heightened chance of 
misidentification wherein a witness "thereafter is apt to retain in 
his memory the image of the photograph rather than of the person 
actually seen, reducing the trustworthiness of subsequent line-up or 
courtroom identification." State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 651 (Utah 
1989) (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383-84 
(1968)). Brett Huff, the Smith's employee, mistakenly identified 
Matthew Wright as the person who attempted to cash the check. 
Huff may have believed that the black male looked like 
Mr. Wright, but Huff was never given the opportunity to consider 
pictures of other suspects. For instance, William Clark not only 
possessed similar physical and facial characteristics as Matthew 
Wright, Clark had also gained access into the residence where 
Schmidt's checkbook was located. Wright and Clark had the same hair 
style; they weighed about the same; and they were approximately the 
same height, with nothing more than an inch or two between them. 
(R 218-19). Robert Schmidt, Wright's roommate, noted the 
similarities: "They looked a lot alike. But just because I know 
them I could tell the difference myself." (R 219). As roommates 
Schmidt and Wright interacted continually over a six month period. 
By contrast, Huff's brief acquaintance with Wright consisted 
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I win l- i in') t "" -ll'*«i ifiii I ifte ><n-in twenty minutes during an enaht 
hour shift. best, Huff also passed Wright as one person left 
work just as the other arrived. L Huff did not know Wright 
well anothe IIIi.lack male possessing 
similar characteristics. 
However, Huff may have well believed that Wright was 
perse temptec pass the check because Wright and Clark 
looked alike; Huff was shown only one picture; and the police 
declined to further investigate into whether there were iini'v i t h o r 
suspec- -hereby prevent:ii i lg Hi iff from comparing or contrasting 
between Wright and Clark. Cf. Simmons, - at 384 ("the 
photographic identification procedure [may 
suggest:! v € as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification") Over time and trial, Huff 
steadfastly stood by the photographic imager 11 >w d :i nto 1: : :i s 
memory. But see State v. Lonqf 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986) ("In 
fact, the accuracy of an identification is, at times, inversely 
related to the confidence 
The entire identification process was flawed because unlike 
Bruce, where an officer's initial identification and confirmation 
encompassed no other suspects, 779 
identification failed to incorporate a remaining suspect who looked 
similar to Wright and who had access to the residence where the 
checkbook was located. The identified! urn MI . improper. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse his 
conviction and remand for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this / day of September, 1993. 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) Alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pub-
lishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, comple-
tion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or ut-
terance purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent 
or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in 
a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing or any other method 
of recording information, checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or iden-
tification. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing is or purports to 
be: 
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing is-
sued by a government, or any agency thereof; or 
(b) A check with a face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stocks, 
bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in or 
claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any 
person or enterprise. 
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be 
a check with a face amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
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